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Westudy the response of complex networks subject to attacks on vertices and edges. Several existing
complex networkmodels aswell as real-world networks of scientific collaborations and Internet traffic
are numerically investigated, and the network performance is quantitativelymeasured by the average
inverse geodesic length and the size of the largest connected subgraph. For each case of attacks on
vertices and edges, four different attacking strategies are used: removals by the descending order
of the degree and the betweenness centrality, calculated for either the initial network or the current
network during the removal procedure. It is found that the removals by the recalculated degrees
and betweenness centralities are often more harmful than the attack strategies based on the initial
network, suggesting that the network structure changes as important vertices or edges are removed.
Furthermore, the correlation between the betweenness centrality and the degree in complex networks
is studied.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Examples of complex networks are abundant in many
disciplines of science and have recently received much
attention [1, 2]. Many works have tried to regenerate
geometrical statistics of real-world networks by genera-
tive algorithms that mimics behaviors found in the real-
world networks. The studies along this line have been
able to model, e.g., the emergence of scale-free degree
distributions [3] and the high clustering of social net-
works [4, 5]. Another group of complex network studies
aims to investigate certain dynamical problems on net-
work topologies [5, 6]. A third group of works studies
how the geometric characteristics and performances of
the networks are affected by the restrictions imposed on
networks. The approach taken by the present paper be-
longs to the third category as we study the robustness of
the network subject to various attack strategies.
Originated from studies of computer networks, “at-
tack vulnerability” [3] denotes the decrease of network
performance due to a selected removal of vertices or
edges. In the present study we measure the attack vul-
nerability of various complex network models and real
world networks. We compare different ways of attack-
ing the network and use various ways of measuring the
resulting damage. In general, this gives a measure of the
decrease of network functionality under a sinister attack.
The meaningful purpose for attack vulnerability studies
is for the sake of protection: If one wants to protect
the network by guarding or by a temporary isolation
of some vertices (edges), the most important vertices
(edges), breaking of which makes the whole network
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malfunctioning, should be identified. Furthermore, one
can learn how to build attack-robust networks, and also
how to increase the robustness of vital biological net-
works. Also in a large network of a criminal organi-
zation, the whole network can be made to collapse by
arresting key persons, which can be identified by a sim-
ilar study. However, the applicability to social networks
may not be very high—acquaintance ties are to some
extent subjective and time dependent [7], and when a
social network structure is under attack, the dynamics
would probably speed up as the organization tries to
protect itself.
A topic closely related to attack vulnerability is that
of the percolation on complex networks [8], where all
vertices (or edges) have the equal probability of being
disabled. In the network of computers this situation cor-
responds to a random breakdown of computers, while
in the problem of the disease spread through network
of people it corresponds to that a randomly chosen set
of people are susceptible. One of the key quantities in
percolation studies, the size of the largest connected sub-
graph, is also used in the present paper as one of the
measures of network performance.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II we pro-
vide the definitions of terms andmeasured quantities. In
Sec. III various attack strategies are explained. In Sec. IV
two real-world networks and several complex network
models used in the present paper are briefly described.
SectionsV, VI, andVII are devoted to themain results, on
the relation between degrees and betweenness centrali-
ties, on the vulnerability under vertex attack, and on the
vulnerability under edge attack. Finally, we summarize
our results in Sec. VIII.
2II. DEFINITIONS OF QUANTITIES
In general, the complex networks—networks of both
randomness and structure—studied in this article can
be represented by an undirected and unweighted graph:
G = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices (or nodes),
and E is the set of edges (or links). Each edge connects
exactly one pair of vertices, and a vertex-pair can be
connected by maximally one edge, i.e., multiconnection
is not allowed. Let furthermore N denote the number of
vertices N = |V| and L the number of edges L = |E|. For
a social network [9], V is a set of persons (or ‘actors’ in
sociology parlance) and E is the set of acquaintance ties
that links the persons together. In computer networksV
represent the routers or computers and E the channels
for computer communication.
There are several ways of measuring the functionality
of networks. One key quantity is the average geodesic
length `, which is sometimes termed “the characteristic
path length,” defined by:
` ≡ 〈d(v,w)〉 ≡ 1
N(N − 1)
∑
v∈V
∑
w,v∈V
d(v,w),
where d(v,w) is the length of the geodesic between v and
w (v,w ∈ V), i.e., the number of edges in the shortest
path connecting the two, and the factor 1/N(N − 1) is
one over the number of pairs of vertices. If ` is large the
dynamics (of epidemics, information flow, etc.) is slow
in the network. Social networks are known to have very
short average geodesic length, ` ∝ logN, with the “six
degrees of separation”, ` ≈ 6, of earth’s population as a
celebrated example [10]. The logarithmic increase of `
is also characteristic of computer networks, and ` ≈ 17
has been estimated for the entire World-Wide Web [3].
As the number of removed vertices or edges is increased,
the networkwill eventually break into disconnected sub-
graphs. The average geodesic length, by definition, be-
comes infinite for such a disconnected graph, and one
can instead study the average inverse geodesic length:
`−1 ≡
〈
1
d(v,w)
〉
≡ 1
N(N − 1)
∑
v∈V
∑
w,v∈V
1
d(v,w)
, (1)
which has a finite value even for a disconnected graph
since 1/d(v,w) = 0 if no path connects v and w. It should
be noted that the notation `−1 does not mean the re-
ciprocal of `. The functionality of the network is then
measured by `−1: the larger `−1 is the better the network
functions.
Since subsequent attacks will disintegrate the net-
work, the size of the largest connected subgraph is also
an interesting quantity for measuring the functionality
of the networks. In social networks, the largest con-
nected subgraph is known to have a size of the order of
the entire network, and accordingly is called “giant com-
ponent” [11]. Throughout the present paper, we denote
the size of the giant component as S, which will be used
together with `−1 to study the attack vulnerability.
FIG. 1: An example of how to calculate the local clustering
coefficient γv of the vertex v. The full-filled black circles indi-
cate the neighborhood Γv of v, and the thick lines are the edges
connecting two vertices within Γv. Since there are five such
edges (|Γv|E = 5) and the degree kv = 6, we obtain γv = 1/3
from Eq. (2).
In addition to the logarithmically increasing average
geodesic length, social networks are found to have a high
local transitivity: if {u, v} and {u,w} are two connected
pairs, then v is likely to be connected to w too (and if
it does {u, v,w} is called a “triad”) [12]. The clustering
coefficientγ (introduced inRef. 5) intends tomeasure the
average degree of the local transitivity in a network: Let
|Γv|E denote the number of edges in the neighborhood Γv
of v ∈ V then
γv ≡ |Γv|E(
kv
2
) (2)
is called the local clustering coefficient of the vertex v.
Here the degree kv of v is defined as the number of ver-
tices in Γv, i.e., kv ≡ |Γv|. The “clustering coefficient” is
then defined as the average of γv:
γ ≡ 〈γv〉 ≡ 1N
∑
v∈V
γv. (3)
An alternative interpretation is that γv is the fraction of
number of triads divided by the maximal number of tri-
ads. In Fig. 1, we present an illustration to explain the
meaning of the local clustering coefficient: The number
of edges within the neighborhood |Γv|E = 5 and the de-
gree kv = 6 result in γv = 1/3 in Fig. 1. Both γv and
γ are strictly in the interval [0, 1], with γ = 1 attained
only for a fully connected network, where every vertex
is connected to every other vertex with the total number
of edges L = N(N − 1)/2.
Removals of important verticesmayaffect thenetwork
significantly. For example, in Ref. 3 only a few removals
of verticeswith the highest degrees has been shown to be
enough to alter the behaviors of scale-free networks and
the average geodesic length has been found to increase
dramatically. In the studies of social networks, the cen-
trality is an important concept that tries to capture the
prominence of a person in the embedding social struc-
ture. It is natural to expect that removals of vertices with
high centrality will worsen the functionality of networks
more than the removals by degrees. It should be noted
that the vertex with a low degree can have a high cen-
trality (this will be shown explicitly in Sec. V) and thus
3attacking the network by removing vertices with high
centralities may differ from that by degrees. Among
many centrality measures [14] we focus on the “vertex
betweenness centrality” CB(v) [15] defined for a vertex
v ∈ V as follows:
CB(v) =
∑
w,w′∈V
σww′ (v)
σww′
, (4)
where σww′ is the number of geodesics between w and
w′, and σww′ (v) is the number of geodesics between w
and w′ that passes v. Similarly, one can define the “edge
betweenness centrality” CB(e) for an edge e ∈ E as
CB(e) =
∑
w,w′∈V
σww′ (e)
σww′
, (5)
where σww′ (e) is the number of geodesics between w and
w′ that includes the edge e. Throughout the present
paper, we call CB(v) and CB(e) as the vertex betweenness
and the edge betweenness for brevity. For calculations
ofCB(v) andCB(e) we use theO(NL) algorithm presented
in Refs. 16 and 17.
III. ATTACK STRATEGIES
For the study of attack vulnerability of the network,
the selection procedure of the order in which vertices
are removed is an open choice. One may of course max-
imize the destructive effect at any fixed number of re-
moved vertices (or edges). However, this requires the
knowledge of thewhole network structure andpinpoint-
ing the vertex to attack in this way makes a very time-
demanding computation. A more tractable choice, used
in the original study of computer networks, is to se-
lect the vertices in the descending order of degrees in
the initial network and then to remove vertices one by
one starting from the vertex with the highest degree [3];
this attack strategy uses the initial degree distribution
and thus is called “ID removal” throughout the current
paper. The vertices with high betweenness also play im-
portant roles in connecting vertices in the network. [31]
The second attack strategy is called “IB removal” and
uses the initial distribution of the betweenness. Both ID
removal and IB removal use the information on the ini-
tial network. Asmore vertices are removed, the network
structure changes, leading to the different distributions
of the degree and the betweenness than the initial ones.
The third attack strategy called “RD removal” uses the
recalculated degree distribution at every removal step,
and the fourth strategy, we call it “RB removal”, is based
on the recalculated betweenness at every step. RD re-
moval has been used in Refs. 18, 19. It should be noted
that ID and RD removals are local strategies, while the
other two based on the betweenness are global ones,
which makes the applications of ID and RD O(N) algo-
rithms while IB and RB are O(NL) even with the best
FIG. 2: Various attack strategies for edge removals applied to
a realization of the generative algorithm of the Watts-Strogatz
model of small-world network (see Sec. IVD). From left to
right, the evolutions of network structures are shown for the
edge attack strategies based on ID (initial degree), IB (initial
betweenness), RD (recalculated degree), and RB (recalculated
betweenness), respectively. The initial network structure is
displayed at the top left corner of each column and the subse-
quent structures at next nine steps are exhibited (first four steps
from top to bottom and then five more steps from top right to
bottom right). For an individual subgraph the thickness of the
lines is proportional to the betweenness of the corresponfing
edge.
known algorithm [16, 17]. The other important differ-
ence between the degree-based and the betweenness-
based strategies is that the former concentrate on reduc-
ing the total number of edges in the network as fast as
possible whereas the latter concentrate on destroying as
many geodesics as possible. It is not entirely clear a
priori which one of these four different attack strategies
should be more harmful than the others, although one
can naively expect that RD and RB are more harmful
than ID and IB, respectively. It should also be noted that
for the strategies based on the recalculated information
themost harmful sequences for removals ofNrm vertices
and N′rm vertices (Nrm , N′rm) might differ significantly
even in the early stage of attacks.
One can also attack edges instead of vertices. In the
network of computers attacking edges may correspond
to the cutting off the communication cables, while the
attacks on vertices can be interpreted as breakdowns of
servers by malicious hackers. (The opposite is of course
also imaginable: a software obstruction of a communi-
cation link, or a server destroyed physically.) The vul-
nerability of networks under edge attacks is also studied
by using similar strategies (we again call them as ID, IB,
RD, and RB removals of edges). The concept of the edge
betweenness was introduced in Sec. II from a straight-
forward generalization of the vertex betweenness. On
the other hand, the definition of the “edge degree” is not
so clear. But still it is expected that the importance of
an edge should be possible to assess by the degrees of
the two vertices it connects. In this work we attempt to
define the edge degree ke from the local information of
4the vertex degrees in several different ways:
ke ≡ kv kw, (6a)
ke ≡ kv + kw, (6b)
ke ≡ min(kv, kw), (6c)
ke ≡ max(kv, kw), (6d)
where the edge e connects two vertices v andwwith ver-
tex degrees kv and kw, respectively. As will be discussed
in Sec. V, among the above definitions, we find that
Eq. (6a) gives a more reasonable result (a higher CB(e)
to ke correlation) than the others, and thus the “edge de-
gree” defined as ke ≡ kvkw is used for the attack strategies
ID and RD edge removals.
From the definitions, we expect that a vertex with
higher degree usually should have higher betweenness
in most real-world networks. However, the correlation
between edge degree and edge betweenness is less obvi-
ous. This is expected to show a larger difference between
degree-based and betweenness-based attack strategies
for edge attacks than for vertex attack. The four differ-
ent edge attack strategies applied to a network generated
by Watts and Strogatz’ small-world network model (see
Sec. IVD) is shown in Fig. 2. Quite soon the original net-
work structure is lost and procedure-specific structures
emerge. For example, the RB edge removal concentrates
on edges of high betweenness, and thus edges which
carry more geodesics are first lost. Consequently, it is
not a surprise that the resulting network structure by RB
consists of highly connected clusters and vertices with
no neighbors. The RD procedure, on the other hand,
removes edges connecting vertices with high vertex de-
grees, and therefore it is natural that the original network
is split intomany subgraphs of verticeswith low (but not
zero) degrees.
In Secs. VI and VII, we investigate various networks
subject to the above mentioned four different attack
strategies, ID, IB, RD, and RB, applied for vertex re-
movals and edge removals. To detect the damages
caused by those attacks, we measure the average in-
verse geodesic length `−1 in Eq. (1) as well as the size S
of the giant component. As the vertex attack proceeds,
both the remaining number of vertices and the average
inverse geodesic length decrease, which, from the defini-
tion of `−1, suggests that `−1 can be both increasing and
decreasing, depending on how much damage is made
by the removals. However, the edge removals do not
change the number of vertices in the network and thus
`−1 should be a decreasing function of the number of re-
moved edges. Similarly, S is expected to show different
behaviors for vertex and edge removals. For vertex re-
movals, S versus the number of removed vertices should
have a slope unity in the initial attack stages since the
removed vertex probably belonged to the giant compo-
nent. On the other hand, the initial edge attacks should
not change the size of the giant component, and thus S
versus the number of removed edges should start as a
horizontal line.
We conclude the section with some technical details:
In any case where two or more vertices (edges) could
equally be chosen by some strategy, the selection is done
randomly. For the RB strategy, if the betweenness is
zero for all vertices, i.e., the vertices are either isolated or
linked to exactly one neighbor, the vertices with kv = 1
are attacked before the meaningless attack of vertices
with kv = 0.
IV. NETWORKS
To study the emergence of different geometrical prop-
erties of complex networks such as social networks,
power grids, metabolic networks, computer networks
and so on, different generative algorithms have been
proposed [1]. Among various existingmodels for gener-
ating networks similar to real ones, two generic models,
the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model of the small-world net-
works [5] and the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model of the
scale-free network [3, 20], have been widely studied.
Both models commonly show the behavior that two
arbitrarily chosen vertices are connected by a remark-
ably short path. More specifically, the average geodesic
length has been found to scale logarithmically with the
network size. On the one hand, the WS model does
not exhibit the power-law distribution of degree which
many real networks show and the BA model success-
fully produces. On the other hand, the WS model has
high clustering like, e.g., social networks, whereas the
BA model has a clustering coefficient that scales toward
zero as N → ∞. There have been attempts to revise
and extend those representative models in order to pro-
duce a network model which can show the small aver-
age geodesic length, the scale-free degree distribution,
and high clustering, all at the same time [4, 22]. In this
work, we study two real networks, a “social network”
constructed from scientific collaboration data (Sec. IVA),
and a “computer network” constructed from computer
traffic over the Internet (Sec. IVB), as well as four model
networks, the random network model by Erdo¨s and
Re´nyi (ER), the WS model, the BA model, and the clus-
tered scale-free network (CSF) model suggested by two
of the present authors in Ref. 4 (Secs. IVC through IVF).
It should be noted that network models such as those
mentioned above, model the emergence of structure in
networks—structure that can be monitored by certain
quantities such as degree distribution, clustering coeffi-
cient, an so on. However, they do (probably) not sam-
ple the ensemble of networks defined by specific values
of these quantities uniformly. This is known to be the
case for other ways of generating random graphs with
structural biases that are easier to give a probability-
theoretical analysis [23]. That the sampling is biased
make inference from the scaling of quantities difficult—
if, e.g., one model gives networks with the same values
as another except, say, a smaller clustering coefficient, it
is not certain that a different behavior under, say, edge
5removal is due to the lower clustering.
A. Scientific collaboration network from the hep-lat
e-print archive
To obtain a well-defined social network from real
world data we follow Ref. 17 and construct a network
of scientific collaborations from the the Los Alamos
preprint archives [24] in the following way: If two
scientists wrote an article together, they are connected
by an edge. Accordingly, the vertices in the network
are scientists, and the edges represent the collaboration
ties. For the attack vulnerability calculations, the whole
Los Alamos e-print archive is too big to be computation-
ally tractable, [32] instead we chose hep-lat database,
which contains preprints about lattice studies in high
energy physics, among various subcategories only for a
computational convenience. The network used in anal-
ysis has N = 2010 (the number of vertices) and L = 6614
(the number of edges), and the size of the giant com-
ponent is S = 1412 and the clustering coefficient is
γ ≈ 0.571. A discussion on the usefulness of collab-
oration networks as real-world social networks can be
found in Ref. 17.
B. Computer network from Internet traffic
To build the network structure for the computer com-
munications we follow Ref. 20 and use data from the
National Laboratory for Applied Network Research
(NLANR) [25]. Here the network is constructed as fol-
lows: Over a period of 24 hours a number of servers
associated to NLANR and physically spread over the
USA, gathers information computer interconnections.
For every connection established through a server the
whole path, from the originating vertex to the requested
destination, is added to the network graph. To be
more specific the servers are using the Border Gate-
way Protocol (BGP) to relay connections over Inter-
net’s largest scale [26]. Vertices are computer networks,
or “Autonomous Systems” in BGP nomenclature, in-
terconnected by one or many BGP servers. An edge
thus represents an establisheddirect connection between
two Autonomous Systems. The data we analyze, gath-
ered on 28th December 1999, represent a network with
N = S = 2210, L = 4334, and γ ≈ 0.221.
C. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model of random networks
In the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) model [27], we start from N
vertices without edges. Subsequently, edges connect-
ing two randomly chosen vertices are added until the
total number of edges becomes L. It generates random
networks with no particular structural bias: The only
FIG. 3: The Watts-Strogatz (WS) model of small-world net-
works. The starting point is a regular one-dimensional lattice
in (a) with the range r = 2 of the connections. Every edge is
visited once and thenwith the rewiring probabilityP is rewired
to other vertex. The WS model can generate (a) the local reg-
ular network when P = 0, with the high clustering but with
the large average geodesic length, and (c) the fully random
network when P = 1, with low clustering but with very short
geodesic length. In the intermediate region of P depicted in (b),
theWSmodel has both high clustering and the small-world be-
havior (more specifically, the average geodesic length ` ∝ logN
for the network with the size N).
restriction in the model is that no multiple edges are al-
lowed between two vertices. In this study, we choose the
average degree 〈k〉 ≡ 2L/N as a control parameter in the
ER model. The ER model graphs have a logarithmically
increasing `, a Poisson-type degree distribution, and a
clustering coefficient close to zero.
D. Watts-Strogatz model of small-world networks
In the WS model [5] one starts by constructing a reg-
ular one-dimensional network with only local connec-
tions of range r. For example, r = 2 means that each
vertex is connected to its two nearest neighbors and
two next nearest neighbors (see Fig. 3(a)). Then each
edge is visited once, and with the rewiring probability
P is detached at the opposite vertex and reconnected
to a randomly chosen vertex forming a ‘shortcut’. (See
the illustration in Fig. 3.) For P = 0 the network is a
regular local network, with high clustering, but with-
out the small-world behavior: The average geodesic
length in this case grows linearly with the network size.
In the opposite limit of P = 1, where every edge has
been rewired, the generated random graph has vanish-
ing clustering, but shows a logarithmic behavior of the
average geodesic length ` ∝ logN. In an intermediate
range of P (typically P ∼ O(1/N)), the network generated
by theWSmodel displays bothhigh clustering and small-
world behavior—the commonly found characteristics of
real social networks.
E. Baraba´si-Albert model of scale-free networks
Apart from the average geodesic length and cluster-
ing, the degree distribution is a structural bias that has
received much attention. Many (but not all) real net-
works are known to have a power-law distribution of
6FIG. 4: The construction of the clustered scale-free (CSF) net-
work in Sec. IV F. (a) In the preferential attachment step for
the newly added vertex v (denoted as filled black circle), the
white vertex u is chosen with the probability proportional to
its degree (the dashed line represents the new edge). (b) In the
triad formation step an additional edge (dashed line) is added
to a randomly selected vertex w in the neighborhood Γu of the
vertex u chosen in the previous preferential attachment step
in (a). The vertices marked by × are not allowed since they
are not in Γu. Without the triad formation step, the CSF model
reduces to the original BA model of scale-free networks.
degrees [3, 28], manifesting a scale-free nature of the
network. The BA model of scale-free network [3, 20] is
defined by the following ingredients:
• Initial condition: To startwith the network consists
of m0 vertices and no edges.
• Growth: One vertex vwithm edges is added every
time step.
• Preferential attachment: An edge is added to an
old vertex with the probability proportional to its
degree. More precisely, the probability Pu for a
new vertex v to be attached to u is [33]:
Pu =
ku∑
w∈V kw
. (7)
The growth step is iterated N − m0 times to construct
the network with the size N, for each growth step the
preferential attachment step is iterated m times. The
above described BA model has been shown to generate
scale-free networks with the logarithmically increasing
average geodesic length with the size N. However, the
original BA model results in networks with low cluster-
ing.
F. Clustered scale-free network model
In order to incorporate the high clustering of social
networks one can modify the standard BA model by
adding one additional step:
• Triad formation: If an edge between v and u was
added in the previous step of preferential attach-
ment, then add an edge from v to a randomly cho-
sen neighbor w of u. This forms a triad, three ver-
tices connected each other. If there is no available
vertex to connect within Γu—do a preferential at-
tachment step instead.
For every new vertex, after an additional preferential
attachment step, the triad formation step is performed
with a probability Pt (and thus a preferential attachment
with the probability 1−Pt). The average number of triad
formation trials per added vertexmt ≡ (m− 1)Pt is taken
as a control parameter in this clustered scale-free (CSF)
network model (see Fig. 4). The scale-free degree dis-
tribution of the original BA model is conserved in CSF
model whose properties have been analyzed in detail
in Ref. 4. In the limiting case of mt = 0, the original
BA network is constructed from the CSF model. The
CSF model has been shown to exhibit the high clus-
tering (furthermore the clustering coefficient is tunable
by the control parameter mt) while it still preserves the
characteristics found in the BA model such as the loga-
rithmically increasing average geodesic length and the
scale-free degree distribution.
V. CORRELATION BETWEEN DEGREE AND
BETWEENNESS
For the six different networks described in Sec. IV,
we seek the relation between the degree and the be-
tweenness for vertices and edges. Both the degree and
the betweenness, to some extent, measure how impor-
tant the vertex (edge) is. The natural expectation is that
the vertex (edge) with higher degree should also have
higher betweenness. The calculation of the betweenness
is based on the global information on paths connecting
all pairs of vertices, while the degree, by definition, is the
quantity which depends on only the local information.
This implies that the identification of the relation be-
tween the degree and the betweenness can have a prac-
tical importance since one can approximately estimate
the betweenness from the degree.
We first show in Fig. 5 scatter plots of the vertex be-
tweenness CB(v) versus the vertex degree kv. As ex-
pected, networks with the scale-free degree distribu-
tions, (a) the scientific collaboration network, (b) the
computer network, (e) the BA network, and (f) the CSF
network, show clear signs of correlation between the de-
gree and the betweenness. As the scale-free network
becomes more clustered (from the BA model to the CSF
model), the correlation between CB(v) and kv becomes
weaker, manifested by more scattered plots in (f) than
(e). The ER and the WS models, (c) and (d), respec-
tively, are characterized by the absence of vertices with
very high degrees, whichmakes the correlation between
CB(v) and kv rather difficult to observe especially in the
region of high degrees. However, notable correlations
are evident even for these networks with exponential
cut-off in degree distributions.
For the study of the correlation between the edge de-
gree ke and the edge betweenness CB(e), we try four dif-
ferent definitions of the edge degree in Eq. (6) from the
assumption that the edge degree can be defined by only
the degrees of vertices it connects. For all networks, ex-
7FIG. 5: Correlation between the vertex betweenness CB(v) and
the vertex degree kv for (a) scientific collaboration network,
(b) the computer network, (c) the ER network with the size
N = 104, and the average degree 〈k〉 = 6, (d) the WS network
with N = 104, r = 3, and P = 0.01, (e) the BA network with
N = 104, m0 = 5, and m = 3, and (f) the CSF network with
N = 104, m0 = 5, m = 3, and mt = 1.8; (see Sec. IV for details of
networks). All are in log-log scales except for (c) and (d).
cept the scientific collaboration network, we find (at least
some) correlation between ke and CB(e). This correlation
is most evident with the definition in Eq. (6a): ke ≡ kvkw,
where kv and kw are degrees of vertices v and w which
the edge e connects. But the definition ke ≡ min(kv, kw),
Eq. (6c), also displays a high correlation between ke and
CB(e). This suggests that the lower degree of the two ver-
tices an edge connects, is more important for a high edge
betweenness than the greater degree of the two vertices.
In other words, this illustrates the quite natural situation
that an edge does not necessarily become central just be-
FIG. 6: Correlation between the edge betweenness CB(e) and
the edge degree ke defined in Eq. (6a). The networks in this
figure are identical to those in Fig. 5. Except (a) for the scien-
tific collaboration network, all networks show clear correlation
between the two quantities.
cause it connects to one central vertex, rather it has to be
a bridge between two central vertices.
For the scientific collaboration network it turns out
that none of the definitions of edge degree manifests the
correlation clearly. Figure 6 shows the scatter plots for
the edge degree and the edge betweenness, correspond-
ing to the networks in Fig. 5. Especially, the similar-
ity between the real network and the model network
is evident between the computer network and the CSF
network (compare (b) and (f) in Figs. 5 and 6), which
suggests that the CSF model describes the network of
computers better than the BA model. As far as the edge
degree and betweenness are concerned, one can also ar-
gue that none of existing network model seems to de-
8scribe the scientific collaboration network properly, and
the origin of the geometric difference in this network still
remains to be studied.
VI. VERTEX ATTACK
In this section, we study the attack vulnerability of six
different complex networks described in Sec. IV by using
the vertex attack strategies introduced in Sec. III, i.e., ver-
tex removals using the information on the initial degree
(ID), the initial betweenness (IB), the recalculated de-
gree (RD), and the recalculated betweenness (RB). From
the observation of the correlation between the vertex de-
gree and the vertex betweenness in Sec. V, one expects
that both betweenness-based and degree-based attack
strategies should result in similar vulnerability behav-
iors. However, the detailed behaviors are found to show
a variety of interesting differences among the networks.
Figure 7 summarizes the results for the vertex attack
vulnerability measured by the average inverse geodesic
length `−1 defined in Eq. (1) and the size S of the giant
component as functions of the number Nrm of removed
vertices.
The two real-world networks, the scientific collabo-
ration network and the computer network, show very
distinct behavior: `−1 and S for the latter decay expo-
nentially as shown in the inset in Fig. 7(b), whereas the
former network (Fig. 7(a)) the decays of `−1 and S are al-
most linear. Another difference between the two real net-
works is that for the computer network the degree-based
attack strategies (ID andRD) and the betweenness-based
strategies (IB and RB) are almost equally harmful while
the scientific collaboration network is more vulnerable
to betweenness-based strategies (compare the insets of
Fig. 7(a) and (b)). This behavior is somehow expected
from the observation in Sec. V since in the region of
high degrees (or in the early stage of attacks when most
important vertices are removed) the computer network
shows higher correlation between kv and CB(v) than the
scientific collaboration network (compare Fig. 5(a) and
(b)). In Fig. 7(a) for the scientific collaboration network,
as the number Nrm of removed vertices is increased `−1
for IB increases. This should not be interpreted as an
enhancement of network functionality, but as an indica-
tion that the removed vertices are not the members of
the largest connected subgraph (the giant component).
In Fig. 7(a) the coherence between `−1 and S are also
observable: Both show the jumps at the same places,
when removal of one vertex results in the segmentation
of the giant component. The removal procedures based
on the initial network, ID and IB, are as expected not effi-
cient for large Nrm. At this point the network structures
has changed so much compared to the initial network
that the initially important vertices have lost their signif-
icance.
We next compare two model networks, the ER and
the WS networks, which have exponential cut-off in the
degree distributions. For the ER model in Fig. 7(c) the
degree-based attack strategies prevail the betweenness-
based ones. The strategies based on recalculated infor-
mation are as expectedmore harmful than their counter-
parts based on the initial network. The two measured
quantities `−1 and S rank the removal procedures in the
same order. The WS small-world network model shows
a completely different behavior than the ER model (see
Fig. 7(d)). For small Nrm the RB procedure is the most
harmful followed by the two degree based strategies.
For the removal procedures based on the initial network
the order is reversed—ID is more harmful than IB. These
behaviors persist in the interval 0 6 Nrm . 2rNP, where
2rNP is the number of endpoints of rewired edges, and
other different behaviors emerge for larger Nrm. This
crossover behavior can be explained since when Nrm
exceeds the number of the rewired edge endpoints the
original WS model topology is lost. For larger Nrm the
RB procedure retains its position as the most harmful
procedure, although RD almost coincides with RB for
Nrm/N & 0.5. The ID and IB procedures are already at an
early stage quite harmless compared to RB as `−1 starts to
increase just as for the scientific collaboration network of
Fig. 7(a). (A sign thatmostly unimportant vertices are re-
moved.) The most interesting and unexpected behavior
occurs in an intermediate region around Nrm/N ≈ 0.25.
Here the RD is the least harmful of all four procedures.
It is also the only case where a recalculated informa-
tion based procedure is less harmful than its counterpart
based on the initial configuration. This clearly shows
that choosing the vertex with highest degree is not an
efficient way to destruct the WS small-world network.
Recall that in the original network the degree is seldom
far from 2r.
The BA model (reviewed briefly in Sec. IVE) was in
focus in the first study of the vulnerability of scale-free
networks [20]. Scale-free networks are more sensitive to
vertex removal than the ER and WS models. This is of
course due to the large variation in the importance (mea-
sured both by degree and betweenness) of the vertices,
i.e., there exist very important vertices which plays very
important roles in the network functionality. In the ER
and WS models the distribution of relevant measures of
vertex importance, such as degree and betweenness, are
restricted by the scale in the model. In the BA model
shown in Fig. 7(e), the differences among the removal
procedures are not significant in the early attack stage.
However, as the removals proceed, the attack strategies
harm network more in the order, RB > RD > ID > IB (the
inequality RB > RDmeans that RB is more harmful than
RD): As expected, strategies with recalculated degrees
and betweennesses are more harmful. One interesting
observation is the change of order between degree-based
and betweenness-based strategies, i.e., (RB > RD versus
ID > IB): This implies that the betweenness distribution
changes more during the removal procedure than the
degree distribution, which is natural since the between-
ness depends on the global network structure, whereas
9FIG. 7: Vertex attack vulnerability is measured by the average inverse geodesic length ˜`−1 and the size of giant component S˜ (see
Sec. II), normalized by the values for initial networks, for (a) the scientific collaboration network, (b) the computer network, (c)
the ERmodel with and 〈k〉 = 6, (d) theWSmodel with r = 3, and P = 0.01, (e) the BAmodel withm = 3 andm0 = 5, and (f) the CSF
model with m = 3, m0 = 5, and mt = 1.8. N = 1500 for (c)-(f), see Sec. IV for details of networks. Four different attack strategies,
each of which based on the initial degrees (ID), the initial betweenness (IB), the recalculated degree (RD), and the recalculated
betweenness (RB), are used (see Sec. III). Empty symbols represent `−1 obtained from attack strategies based on initial information,
i.e, empty triangles (circles) for ID (IB), while filled symbols are for `−1 from recalculated information, i.e., filled triangles (circles)
for RD (RB). For model networks (c)-(f), the error bars estimated from the calculations for ∼ 40 different network realizations are
also plotted and they are smaller than the size of symbols. Lines represent S: Solid line represents RB, dash-dotted line represents
RD, dotted line represents ID, and dashed line represents RB. Insets are magnifications in the early stages of attacks (note that
inset in (b) is in the lin-log scale).
the degree of a vertex is a quantity dependent on only
its neighborhood.
The CSF networkmodel in Sec. IV Fwith tunable clus-
tering is found to be even more attack vulnerable than
the BAmodel as evident from the comparison of Fig. 7(e)
and (f). This can be explained from the finding that for a
fixed number of edges higher clustering makes the net-
work less efficient. In other words, more geodesics go
through the same important vertex when the network is
highly clustered, making ` larger (or `−1 smaller) [4], and
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FIG. 8: Low degree vertex w taking the load off a highly con-
nected vertex v. It shows how high clustering can make con-
nectivity less important for the routing of geodesics: v with a
high degree shares many geodesics with its low-degree neigh-
borw. The grey regions represents the part of the network that
is connected to v. The arrows indicate that those geodesics can
routed by either v or w.
FIG. 9: Schematic diagram to show how an edge can lose or
increase its betweenness. (a) The edge ahas ahighbetweenness
as a bridge connecting the left and the right part of the network.
(b) When the edge a is removed, e is only a part of geodesics
in the right-hand side, and thus has lower betweenness than
before the removal of a. On the other hand, if the edge b
had been removed, the betweenness of ewould have increased
since all geodesics passing from the left to the right hand side
would pass through e.
at the same time making the network more vulnerable
to the removal of an important vertex with many triads
attached to it. Unlike the BA scale-free network model
in Fig. 7(e), in the CSF network ID is not necessarily less
harmful than RD for allNrm. In other words, the cluster-
ing makes the degree less important when assessing the
vulnerability of a vertex. This can be explained by con-
figurations such as the one in Fig. 8, which also causes
the lower correlation between degree and betweenness
mentioned above in Sec. V.
VII. EDGE ATTACK
In the original study of the attack vulnerability of
scale-free networks [20], only the vertex attacks have
been considered, which may be interpreted as intruder-
caused breakdowns of servers in computer networks,
for instance. In this section, we study the vulnerability
of complex networks subject to various types of edge at-
tacks (see Sec. III for details of the edge attack strategies).
For example, in computer networks, this can be inter-
preted as themalfunctioning or the loss of the communi-
cation cables. In the context of social networks, the attack
on an edge can be interpreted as prohibition of contact
between two individuals—a scenario that admittedly is
somewhat artificial, but could possibly have practical
implications to the prevention of spreading of sexually
transmitted diseases [28]. As long as the network is
not segmented into pieces, the average betweenness in-
creases during edge attacks since the reduced number of
edges should carry the same number of geodesics. How-
ever, this is not necessarily true for individual edges as
illustrated in Fig. 9.
Figure 10 displays the results for the vulnerability to
various edge attacks in six different complex networks.
The symbols in Fig. 10 have the same meanings as in
Fig. 7 in Sec. VI. Remember the different definitions of
`−1 for vertices and edges: When edges are removed the
total number N of vertices in the denominator in Eq. (1)
does not change, making `−1 amonotonously decreasing
function with the number Lrm of removed edges.
The two real-world networks behave quite similarly
under edge attacks as shown in Fig. 10(a) and (b), in
contrast to vertex attacks where `−1 decay linearly for
the scientific collaboration network and exponentially
for the computer network (see Sec. VI and Fig. 7(a) and
(b)). For both real networks the RB procedure is themost
destructive, followed by the IB procedure, in a broad
range of Lrm. The degree-based attack strategies, ID and
RD, are found not as efficient as the betweenness-based
ones, IB and RB, (in every case except large Lrm for the
WS mode), which suggests that the edge betweenness is
more suitable quantity than the edge degree to measure
the importance of an edge. The correlation between the
degree and the betweenness is stronger for vertices than
edges (compare Fig. 5 and Fig. 6), which is related to
the above finding that the edge degree fails to capture
the importance of edges. We again find the similarity
in the behavior of `−1 and S in Fig. 10(b): When a large
part of the network becomes disconnected from the gi-
ant component, both S and `−1 show jumps simultane-
ously. On most occasions S and `−1 show the common
features although each measures a distinct aspect of net-
work performance: For example, the computer network
in Fig. 10(b) at Lrm/L ≈ 0.5 exhibits the order of destruc-
tiveness RB > RD > IB > ID judging from `−1, whereas S
gives the ranking RB > IB > RD > ID.
The two network models with the degree distribu-
tions characterized by exponential tails (the ER and the
WS models), display again quite different vulnerability
under edge attacks. For the ERmodel, judging from `−1,
the two attack strategies based on recalculated informa-
tion (RD and RB) are the most harmful, and RB is clearly
more harmful than all other three (see Fig. 10(c)). The
RD curve for S differs from the rest: S is almost con-
stant until Lrm reaches Lrm/L ≈ 0.7, where S decreases
very rapidly. The reason for this behavior is that the RD
removal cuts edges between vertices that are highly con-
nected, but the bridges—edges that, if removed, would
disconnect the graph—are not necessarily linking ver-
tices of high degree. Thus the structure emerging from
repeated application of the RD strategy is characterized
by a chain-like structure (low degrees of the vertices but
relatively large connected subgraphs). This is also well
illustrated by Fig. 2, where the maximal degree for the
RD removal is kv = 2 already at Lrm = 7 (the same num-
bers for the other procedures are Lrm = 9 for ID and RD,
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FIG. 10: Edge attack vulnerability for the same networks as in Fig. 7 subject to four different edge attack strategies (see Sec. III).
Lrm is the number of removed edges and the other symbols and notations are the same as in Fig. 7. For the degree-based edge
attack strategies, the definition of the edge degree in Eq. (6a) has been used.
and Lrm = 10 for RB). The graph is also connected longer
for the ID and RD strategies than for the betweenness-
based strategies.
Just as for the vertex attacks the WS network model
again shows a very different behavior (see Fig. 10(d)).
For the three procedures ID, IB, and RB, the inverse
geodesic length `−1 decaysvery rapidly for smallLrm/L .
0.07. In the WS model the rewired edges are carry-
ing a large portion of geodesics [2]. The vertices which
are endpoints of rewired edges have higher vertex de-
gree (〈k〉 + 1) and accordingly the edges connected to
those endpoint vertices have also higher edge degree
(〈k〉(〈k〉 + 1)), becoming early targets of edge attacks.
Since there exist PL rewired edges, the number of edges
with higher edge degree in initial network is of course
(〈k〉 + 1)PL. Consequently, for 0 6 Lrm . (〈k〉 + 1)PL
(= 0.07L in our case) the network is very vulnerable
to edge attack—in fact, for these three procedures (ID,
IB, and RB) the WS network is more vulnerable than
any other networks we study. On the other hand, for
(〈k〉 + 1)PL . Lrm the network topology has lost most
resemblance to the original network, and in this region
the decay of `−1 is far less rapid than for small Lrm. The
behavior of the RD removal is strikingly different: For
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FIG. 11: Average inverse geodesic length ˜`−1 for edge attack
on the WS small-world network model with sizes N = 500,
1000, and 1500 subject to the RD removal strategy (filled sym-
bols) and IB removal strategy (empty symbols). AsN becomes
larger, ˜`−1 is shown to saturate with a remarkable difference
between RD and ID.
Lrm/L . 0.01 the decay of `−1 is as rapid as the other
three procedures, but for 0.01 . Lrm/L . 0.07 the decay
is much slower. That this behavior is relevant in the
large-N limit is shown in Fig. 11. If an edge e = (v,w)
is rewired and there are not other rewired edges attach-
ing to v or w, the edge degree of e is ke = 〈k〉(〈k〉 + 1),
which is larger than the average ke = 〈k〉2. The RD re-
moval will thus first attack the rewired edges, just as the
ID removal (and probably IB and RB as well), but for
Lrm & 0.01 the RD removal picks less vulnerable edges
than the ID strategy. The reason for this behavior can be
discussed in the context of Fig. 12, where the edge (w,u)
rewired to (w, v) is the only rewired one: The ID re-
moval will remove edges in the neighborhood Γv (which
has ke = 〈k〉(〈k〉+1)) including the rewired edge first, fol-
lowed by edges outside Γu∪Γv (with ke = 〈k〉2) and at last
the edges in Γu (with ke = 〈k〉(〈k〉 − 1)). The RD strategy
will start by removing one edge in Γv, not necessarily
the rewired one. Say (v′, v) is the first removed edge
(where v′ could be equal to w), second edge to remove
can be anyone outside Γu ∪ Γv′ . The RD strategy strives
to keep the degree uniform, which leads to a twofold
disadvantage compared to the ID strategy: Firstly, after
〈k〉+ 1 removed edges the rewired edge is removed with
certainty by the ID removal, but only with a probability
∼ 1/(〈k〉 + 1) by the RD removal. Secondly, that the RD
strategy keeps the degree uniform is also preventing its
efficiency—compare the dashed-dotted (RD) line with
the dashed (ID) line of Fig. 10(d). The mechanism of this
can also be seen from Figs. 12(b) and (c): With the ID
removal all edges in Γv are deleted when Lrm = 〈k〉 + 1
(see Fig. 12(b)), but for the RD removal this is not the
case (see Fig. 12(c)). The part of the graph shown in
Fig. 12(b) can be disconnected by removing three edges,
in Fig. 12(c) the same number is four, but all of these have
a lower degree than the edges not in a neighborhood of
FIG. 12: RD vs ID strategies on aWSmodel networkwith 〈k〉 =
6. the original configuration is shown in (a). The vertically
oriented edge in (a) starting at w is rewired from u to v. In (a),
the thicker lines connected to v represent edges with higher
edge degree, and the thinner lines connected to u represent
edges with lower degree. Typical configurations in the lower
part of (a) after 〈k〉 + 1 (in this case seven) removed edges are
shown in (b) for ID removal and (c) for RD removal, leading
to the prediction that RD is much less harmful than ID as
confirmed in Fig. 10(d).
FIG. 13: Edge attack on a regular one-dimensional network
with connection range r = 3 and N = 1500. Symbols are the
same as in Figs. 7 and 10.
an removed edge and will thus be removed later.
To illustrate the effect of the rewiring in the construc-
tion of the WS network we briefly discuss edge attacks
on a regular network. For IB removal we note that the
betweenness of the initial regular network is increasing
rapidly with the range of the edges. This means that at
Lrm = (r − 1)L/r the graph will be just a connected ring
of kv = 2 vertices. After this it will disintegrate rapidly.
As shown in Fig. 13 for the regular network with r = 3,
this behavior is seen around Lrm = 2L/3. Since the initial
degree of the regular network is uniform, the edges are
removed in a completely random order for the ID pro-
cedure. This makes the graph lose its connectedness at
around Lrm ≈ L/4. When a regular network is attacked
by the RD procedure, the edge and vertex degree will be
kept as uniform as possible. The network will remain
connected until edges of degree ke = (〈k〉/2+ 1)〈k〉/2 will
be removed (since the network cannot be disconnected
unless four vertices of degree 〈k〉/2 exist). This happens
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with (1 + 〈k〉/2)N/2 − 4 edges left in the system, so in
our system S = 1 at least until Lrm/L ≈ 0.33. In Fig. 13
this happens roughly at Lrm/L ≈ 0.36, which is later than
for the ID removal (where S = 1 up to Lrm/L ≈ 0.24).
This effect is also present for the WS-model networks
(mentioned as our second point above). Comparing
Fig. 10(d) and Fig. 13 one notices that the area of rapid
decay of `−1 (0 6 Lrm/L . P for IB, RB, and RD; and
0 6 Lrm/L . (〈k〉 + 1)P for ID) is lacking for the regular
network, confirming that the rewired edges are respon-
sible for this strong vulnerability. Another observation
is that the cusps arising from the regularity of the net-
work in the ˜`−1 curves for IB and RB removal in Fig. 13
are gone in Fig. 10(d). This is of course expected since
the number of rewired edges is different for different
disorder realizations.
For the case of vertex attack, the two network models
with scale-free degree distributions display a rather sim-
ilar behavior. For edge attack there are larger differences.
As seen in Fig. 10(e), for the BA scale-free networkmodel
the recalculated attack strategies are the most harmful.
The differences between the four methods are not very
large for 0 6 Lrm/L . 0.4. This suggests that the charac-
teristic topology of the BA scale-free network model is
retained for this rather broad region. Just like for the ER
model S for the RD procedure decreases very rapidly at
Lrm/L ≈ 0.7, crossing ID and IB curves. For Lrm/L . 0.4
S for ID and IB are actually even below the RB curve.
Similarly to the vertex attack, the CSF model proves to
be more vulnerable than the BA model (see Fig. 10(d)).
Just like the other networks with high clustering (the sci-
entific collaboration network and theWSmodel), the RD
procedure is the least harmful for the CSF network. For
the three unclustered networks, to which the BA mode
belongs, the RD strategy is not the worst. Once again
this can be explained by the low correlation between de-
gree and betweenness for clustered networks (see Sec. V
and Fig. 8) Themost drastic difference between the scale-
free network models is the curves for the RB procedure,
which is the most harmful selection procedure. Here `−1
for the CSF network shows the same positive convexity
as the scientific collaboration network of Fig. 10(b). The
`−1 curve for the IB procedure has, however, a negative
convexity in Fig. 10(d), as opposed to Fig. 10(b). This
could be guessed from that the maximum betweenness
is much higher for the CSF model (Fig. 6(f)) than the
BA model (Fig. 6(e)). Our conclusion is that, although
the CSF model with tunable clustering shows the clos-
est resemblance to the scientific collaboration network,
and this is presumably thanks to the high clustering and
scale-free degree distribution, there are structures gov-
erning real-world networks, which are yet to be quanti-
fied.
In summary of the different networks under various
attack strategies, measured quantities are shown in Ta-
ble VII. The values of ˜`−1 and S˜ are shown after 1% of the
vertices (or edges) are removed, i.e., Nrm/N = Lrm/L =
0.01. This is chosen to be small enough to keep the most
original network structure, but large enough to display
the changes introduced by various types of attacks. The
first criterion obviously fails for the computer network,
but the value 1% is used anyway for the sake of compar-
ison with other networks.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the correlation between degree and
betweenness for both vertices and edges (see Fig. 5). For
vertex degree and vertex betweenness the correlation
is very strong for the ER model and the BA scale-free
network, and is also evident in the WS small-world net-
work model and the scale-free network model with tun-
able clustering. Of the real-world networks the Internet
traffic network shows a strong correlation, whereas the
scientific collaboration network has weaker correlation.
For edges we define an edge degree as the product of
the degrees of the linked vertices. The similar scatter
plots showweaker correlation, a result of the lack of nat-
ural generalization of the degree concept from vertices
to edges.
Computer network shows a unique behavior when
subject to vertex attack—the average inverse geodesic
length `−1 clearly shows an exponentially decay in the
early stages of attacks. Scientific collaboration network,
in contrast, shows a linear decay for the same quantity.
For edge attack on real-world networks the recalculated
betweenness (RB) procedure is the most efficient. The
difference between the attack strategies based on the ini-
tial information and the recalculated information shows
that the change of network structure during the removal
process is substantial. Thismust be taken into considera-
tion if onewants to give efficient protection to a network.
None of the network models shows a behavior very
similar to the real-world networks: Even the clustered
scale-free network model with both high clustering and
the scale-free degree distribution, which are two impor-
tant characteristics in real-world networks, fails to de-
scribe successfully the scientific collaboration network.
This clearly suggests that there are other structures con-
tributing to the network behavior during vertex attack,
and conclusions from model networks should be cau-
tiously generalized to real-world situations. However,
it should be emphasized that the CSF model under edge
attacks with the RB strategy shows a behavior similar
to the highly clustered scientific collaboration network
(compare Fig. 10(a) andFig. 10(f)), whereas theBAmodel
with very low clustering in Fig. 10(e) shows clearly dif-
ferent behavior under the same RB edge attack.
The ER model, that lacks structural bias, is the most
robust of the tested networks. This supports the intu-
itive idea that building a server-less network would be
very robust to attack. Even if the network connections
would be fixed in a random pattern this would lead to
a tremendous increase of attack-robustness of the net-
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˜`−1[S˜] for vertex attack ˜`−1[S˜] for edge attack
Network N 〈k〉 γ ID IB RD RB ID IB RD RB
SC 2010 6.6 0.57 0.90 [0.96] 0.88 [0.98] 0.89 [0.96] 0.86 [0.98] 0.98 [1.00] 0.92 [0.98] 0.95 [1.00] 0.88 [0.95]
CN 2122 4.1 0.22 0.20 [0.62] 0.25 [0.63] 0.20 [0.62] 0.24 [0.66] 0.83 [1.00] 0.74 [0.93] 0.82 [1.00] 0.51 [0.68]
ER 1500 6.0 0.0040 0.98 [0.99] 0.98 [0.99] 0.97 [0.99] 0.98 [0.99] 0.99 [0.99] 0.99 [0.99] 0.99 [1.00] 0.99 [1.00]
WS 1500 6.0 0.58 0.82 [0.99] 0.85 [0.99] 0.82 [0.99] 0.75 [0.99] 0.89 [1.00] 0.65 [1.00] 0.92 [1.00] 0.54 [1.00]
BA 1500 6.0 0.015 0.88 [0.99] 0.88 [0.99] 0.88 [0.99] 0.88 [0.99] 0.98 [1.00] 0.98 [1.00] 0.98 [1.00] 0.98 [1.00]
CSF 1500 6.0 0.54 0.72 [0.99] 0.71 [0.99] 0.72 [0.99] 0.70 [0.99] 0.93 [1.00] 0.94 [1.00] 0.93 [1.00] 0.93 [1.00]
TABLE I: The normalized average geodesic length ˜`−1 and the normalized size of the largest connected component S˜ computed
after 1% of the vertices (edges) are removed. The normalization is made to satisfy ˜`−1 = S˜ = 1 for the original networks. SC, CN,
ER, WS, BA, and CSF denote the scientific collaboration network, the computer network, the random network model by Erdo¨s
and Re´nyi, the Watts-Strogatz model of the small-world, the Baraba´si-Albert model of the scale-free network, and the clustered
scale-free network model in Ref. 4 (see Sec. IV for details of networks).
work (as the ER model shows). Wireless and server-less
networks, so called “ad-hoc networks”, are well studied
from a theoretical viewpoint [29]. Most literature on net-
work security concerns software protection and preven-
tion of loopholes [30], rather than the network topology.
This is of course natural since it is the primary defense
against computer network attack (along with locking
the computer room). But as a background protection, an
attack-robust network topology can be useful; and thus
we believe that the robustness of server-less networks
should encourage further research.
Lacking in this study, and an interesting area for future
studies, is an extensive scaling analysis to establish the
borders in parameter space for the different responses
to the attack procedures. (We study one case with this
method when we, from Fig. 11, conclude that the ID
strategy is more efficient than the RD strategy in the
N →∞ limit.)
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